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I. 
 
great number of contemporary philosophers are 
concerned about the relationship between the facts of 
evolutionary science and the positions that they hold dear. 
Since philosophy tends to address foundational questions 
about the kinds of creatures that human beings are and the 
world that they occupy, and evolution along with its driver 
natural selection have deeply shaped the human experience, 
we might say that any serious philosophical project must at 
some point address evolutionary theory. However, the 
details of evolutionary theory are arcane and, much like the 
data of philosophy itself, often reveal themselves only to 
A 
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those engrossed in the weeds of their respective disciplines. 
Thus, it’s essential for philosophers interested in the 
implications of evolutionary science to get their hands on 
rigorous yet accessible discussions of that science. 
 
To this end, Cooperation and its Evolution ought to be on 
the reading lists of a great many philosophers. It is a rich 
and varied collection of essays by biologists and 
philosophers working at the cutting edges of evolutionary 
science and the crossroads between that science and 
philosophy. Given the fact that the book is an imposing 
tome, weighing at around 600 pages, I hope that this review 
can serve as a guide for interested philosophers, as well as 
those in other related fields. I do this by providing a 
narrative overview of the essays, drawing connections and 
extending ideas where I see fit. 
 
II. 
 
The existence of altruism is often seen by evolutionary 
biologists as a puzzle. Since altruism is defined as some 
creature A sacrificing its own interests for the benefit of 
some other creature (or set of creatures) B, then why would 
altruism improve the reproductive fitness of A? As Ronald 
Noë and Bernhardt Voelkl explain the problem, natural 
selection favors traits and behaviors that promote the 
fitness of the creature who has them, and altruistic 
behaviors don’t do this, then it seems like cooperation 
should never have evolved (Noë and Voelkl p. 131). Yet 
clearly it did evolve! So we need to give an account of how 
it could be that cooperation could have evolved despite the 
uncompensated costs it requires individuals to bear.  
 
The shadow of group selection theory looms large over this 
collection of essays. A growing number of contemporary 
biologists have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that 
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natural selection can work on groups in the same way that 
it works on individuals, by selecting group characteristics 
that promote the fitness of the group. The trouble, of 
course, is that individuals are the carriers of genes, the data 
that selection works on. Even if group selection can be a 
helpful piece of the puzzle, one might think that a story 
needs to be told that can account for the relations between 
individuals and the groups that they constitute. This 
problem, it seems, can be most readily solved by appealing 
to the sorts of cooperation mechanisms found in insect 
societies, as Deborah Gordon does in her essay “What We 
Don’t Know about the Evolution of Cooperation” (Gordon 
p. 197). Ant colonies, for example, reproduce as group 
units. Very few individual ants reproduce. Rather, ant 
colonies have specialized queens that do the reproducing. 
This means that the queen ant which is most likely to 
survive to reproduce is the queen ant that produces 
offspring which do the things most likely to allow the 
survival of the queen, and as a consequence we get ants 
which sacrifice their interests without hesitation when 
doing so is in the interest of the survival of the colony and 
the queen. The fitness that a particular action produces to 
an individual ant is irrelevant to understanding which 
behaviors will be selected for; rather, and this is Gordon’s 
primary point, we need to think ecologically when we try to 
get clear on what exactly the causes of the evolution of 
altruistic behavior are (Gordon pp. 200-1). We need to ask: 
what benefits do ants provide to the fitness of the colony? 
If we look only at fitness at an individual level, the 
existence of cooperation is often far more mysterious than 
if we’re willing to look at fitness on a group level.  
 
This answer, however, is incomplete. What makes 
Gordon’s account work is that ant colonies, in the body of 
the queen, and not individual ants, are the site of selection. 
What, however, should we say when it is individual 
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creatures themselves that do the reproducing? Why is it 
adaptive for, say, some sort of bird, to assist in the 
reproduction of other birds with whom it has not itself 
reproduced? It’s not so obvious that Gordon’s ecological 
solution can be applied here, at least without significant 
qualification. Andrew Cockburn discusses the problem of 
‘cooperative breeding’ in more advanced animals in his 
chapter “Cooperative Breeding in Birds: Toward a Richer 
Conceptual Framework.” Cockburn notes that numerous 
species of birds have individual tendencies to partake in the 
care of offspring which are not their own, which is 
surprising given the aforementioned puzzle of cooperation. 
If it’s costly for a bird to take care of offspring which are 
not their own, with no correlative with no reproductive 
benefit, then how would this tendency have evolved? In the 
Malurus, the species of bird discussed here, there tend to be 
a great number of less equally reproductively desirable 
male birds who never have the opportunity to reproduce, 
given the competition over female birds. Yet if each bird 
themselves has an evolved tendency to care for young, then 
birds which never have young of their own will tend to play 
that out with any young that they can (Cockburn p. 236). 
So we need not be puzzled by the existence of cooperative 
breeding in these species; it’s simply a function of the facts 
that these birds have a disposition to care for young and 
that there tend to be a great number of bachelor birds 
available to aid biological parents. 
 
III. 
 
The internal logic of group selection theory is undoubtedly 
powerful, as the last few paragraphs have shown. The 
interest in providing an explanation for the evolution of 
cooperation, however, does not end at accounting for 
cooperation in ants and birds. We want to know how 
cooperation developed in humans. What about the genetic 
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and phenotypic nature of human beings makes us so 
uniquely good at cooperation? The answer would seem to 
be quite obvious: humans have highly-developed cognitive 
faculties which allow us to do much that other related 
species cannot. For example, though humans tend to be 
shortsighted in deciding which states of affairs would be 
best to bring about, the ability to recognize that we have 
reasons to care about future states of affairs just as we have 
reasons to care about present states of affairs allows 
humans the ability to adapt their choices to ensure that 
future goods are not sacrificed disproportionately in favor 
of present goods (Kokko and Heubel pp. 85-6). Though 
humans have problems being motivated to pursue future 
goods, humans can at least consciously recognize the 
importance of pursuing future goods. It’s not obvious that, 
say, a fish could do the same.  
 
As Felix Warnecken argues, humans can cooperate in ways 
that other animals can’t because humans have more 
advanced cognitive processes available for collecting social 
data from other organisms (Warnecken p. 412ff). We see 
this clearly when we note that non-human primates are 
capable of a high degree of cooperation, so long as the 
tasks at hand are simple enough for their relatively lesser 
cognitive capacities to comprehend (Warnecken pp. 409-
11). Relatedly, Hugo Mercier argues against our common 
sense assumption that highly intelligent people are less 
amenable to influence by others. Less intelligent people 
tend to be less amenable to influence because they reject 
too much information without due consideration, but since 
accepting information tends to produce an adaptive 
advantage, as is the case in human societies, we should 
expect organisms to develop some kind of adaptation that 
allows them to accept information more reliably (Mercier 
p. 375). Thus, we can establish a convincing evolutionary 
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connection between higher cognitive capacities and the 
ability to form cooperative relations.  
 
Humans are uniquely cognitively situated to defer their 
own interests for the benefit of others, even when they 
themselves do not obviously benefit. But certain aspects of 
human social functioning are puzzling in their own right. A 
number of essays in this volume are dedicated to 
accounting for the existence of stable social contracts and 
property norms, a pervasive feature of human societies. 
Kim Sterelny, in his chapter “Life in Interesting Times: 
Cooperation and Collective Action in the Holocene,” 
argues that the social contract that arose as a result of the 
Holocene revolution, where humans began to settle into 
permanent agricultural societies, ought not, from an 
evolutionary perspective, to have occurred. Pre-agricultural 
social contracts are stable, argues Sterelny, because no 
individual in that society has the ability to accumulate 
wealth past a very immediate level. In other words, pre-
agricultural societies have a structural tendency toward 
egalitarianism (Sterelny p. 92ff). However, the Holocene 
revolution turned land into a heritable commodity: those 
who could acquire more land could leave it to their 
offspring (Sterelny p. 97). So we have the development of 
economic inequality. But part of what makes the pre-
agricultural social contract stable is its egalitarian nature. 
Thus, we should be surprised when the Holocene social 
contract turns out to be stable, despite its inegalitarian 
nature. Now clearly this issue is easily answered in 
principle: ethical norms of property rights, as well as 
coercive power, reinforce the practical application of 
property rights. However, and this is Sterelny’s crucial 
point, these Holocene social contracts developed before the 
requisite coercive power and ethical norms were put in 
place. So an explanation of the Holocene social contract 
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desperately needs an account of how the Holocene social 
contract could develop without the existence of the 
functions necessary to hold it in place.  
 
Paul Seabright attempts to sketch an answer to Sterelny’s 
challenge. Though he considers a number of possible 
responses, I think the one most worthy of note is his 
observation that hierarchical social contracts may exploit 
the existence of pre-existing human social impulses 
(Seabright p. 114), a theme which appears throughout 
Cooperation and its Evolution. People may have already 
had a tendency to sacrifice their own interests to further 
those of others in their group; perhaps elites in pre-
agricultural societies were able to prey on this tendency to 
get people to accept economic inequality. Seabright rejects 
this possibility because he thinks that individuals are likely 
to act altruistically only when the benefits of that behavior 
are spread among many people and sufficiently salient to 
themselves, and that the benefits to Holocene inequality are 
unlikely to be salient and motivational in this way.  
 
I think Seabright ought to take this possibility more 
seriously, however, and indeed I think this possibility is a 
strong contender for solving Sterelny’s problem. 
Specifically, I think that the benefits of Holocene inequality 
are likely to be more significant and salient that Seabright 
estimates. One of the guiding assumptions of liberal 
economic theory is that inequality is one aspect of 
economic systems that makes all people better off. Further, 
in Sterelny’s view, inequality is the result of economic 
development. Though some people in Holocene society are 
better off than others, it’s likely that everyone will benefit 
materially, for example, in virtue of a steadier food supply 
and higher crop yields. Adam G. Hart’s discussion of task 
partitioning and division of labor further suggests this 
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move: developing a more complex, hierarchical form of 
social organization may lead to a higher degree of labor 
specialization, providing significant adaptive benefits in 
terms of productivity and flexibility (Hart pp. 203-207). It 
also seems quite reasonable to suppose that individuals in 
these societies would have felt in their own lifetimes their 
economic and material circumstances improve as a result of 
the development of agriculture, especially if we imagine 
the first people settling down and forming agrarian 
societies. If this is the case, then it’s straightforwardly 
beneficial to move to the Holocene agricultural social 
arrangement, even if some benefit disproportionately.  
 
This account of the adaptive nature of stratified agricultural 
social arrangements is expanded by Herbert Gintis in his 
discussion of ‘loss aversion’, or the tendency of creatures to 
expend more to keep an already-held good than to acquire a 
previously-unheld good. Property equilibria can only be 
maintained when those who hold property are willing to 
fight to keep it more than others are willing to fight to take 
it away, because otherwise excessive costs would be paid 
by all creatures in seeking to stake their claims to a territory 
(Gintis p. 123). Applying this to Sterelny’s problem, it 
might turn out that it’s simply far more costly for the have-
nots to fight with the elites over property, especially 
considering the possible distributed economic benefits of 
property that I considered above. Yet the problem here is 
that, once the have-nots unify against the elites, it surely 
becomes less costly to overtake the property of the elites 
than it is to maintain the stratified social system. Indeed, 
Sterelny himself notes this point (Sterelny p. 103). Thus, it 
seems like a Gintis-style answer would fail here; loss 
aversion cannot account for the stability of the Holocene 
social contract. 
 
Essays in Philosophy 16(2) 
 
331 
 
IV. 
 
Though the answer proposed by Seabright is promising, we 
might review another possibility which Sterelny rejects out 
of hand, namely the possibility that ethical norms of 
property rights are responsible for the Holocene revolution. 
It might turn out that the economic answer is fragile, given 
that it isn’t clear whether it is actually in the interest of the 
have-nots to move to a stratified society, but if ethical 
norms worked on individuals in pre-agricultural societies in 
particular ways, then those ethical norms might have 
sufficiently pacified the have-nots to allow the elites to 
hold power over them. Now clearly norms of property 
rights are not evolutionarily free-standing, if they are 
evolutionarily constructed at all, since they did not simply 
appear at the time where they came to be implemented. 
Rather, they had to develop over time. Indeed, according to 
Matteo Mameli, our explicit cognitive moral concepts 
evolved to co-opt our intuitive normative impulses, since 
one can have a purely cognitive understanding that, say, the 
prohibition on murder is a moral norm, but unless one also 
have an intuitive moral concept which pushes them to make 
the decision, one will not act on the understanding of that 
norm (Mameli p. 542). Though the norms that we hold 
explicitly are essential to our moral self-understanding and 
can aid us in doing what we ought to, they are typically 
insufficient to guide and motivate action. Moral norms are 
only effective when they work in accordance with some 
other tendency.  
 
Expanding on this, one way to explain the stability of 
cooperation after the Holocene transition is to show that 
respect for the property rights of others is parasitic on 
some other human tendency, meaning that because this 
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other tendency was already put in place by evolutionary 
processes, still other evolutionary purposes could be 
served by the application of that tendency to new 
problems and new situations. Gintis’s comments on loss 
aversion, already discussed above, are suggestive here. 
Further, in one of the most fascinating essays in this 
volume, Daniel Kelly discusses the relationship between 
the human disgust intuition and certain foundational 
ethical concepts that we hold. Disgust is a physiological 
response that developed in creatures to protect them from 
environmental hazards like parasites and pathogenic 
foods. However, disgust also comes along with certain 
physiological responses, like what Kelly and others have 
called the ‘gape face’, or the face that people make when 
they smell a toxic smell, which warns others that some 
object is worthy of disgust. Further, Kelly argues, the 
social needs of early human beings required us to produce 
signals that could communicate a broad variety of 
information to each other; in the case of disgust, group 
membership and purity, perhaps. It seems like it would be 
less evolutionarily costly to co-opt an already-existing 
capacity response to communicate information about 
group membership than to develop an entirely new one 
(Kelly p. 513). Thus, if the gape face served a social 
purpose, then that purpose could be seen to be parasitic on 
the intuition of disgust elicited by poisonous and 
parasitically-infested food. Similarly, Cecilia Hayes in her 
article “What Can Imitation Do For Cooperation?” 
discusses the fact that a great number of creatures engage 
in imitation with each other as a sort of ‘social glue’ 
which serves to differentiate members of a group from 
those not involved by creating shared experiences. 
Imitation is often unconscious and the signals that are sent 
are thereby quite difficult for those who are not members 
in that group to fake. Thus, from a biological process 
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which is seemingly non-normative we get a strong norm-
ative tendency (Hayes p. 326).  
 
The problem with interpreting Kelly and Heyes on this 
point is that the process is not simply one-directional. It’s 
not just that from imitation as a process we get its social 
cohesion function; the adaptive nature of that social 
cohesion function itself serves to further incentivize and 
reinforce imitation as a biological tendency. So in order to 
understand exactly what is going on here, it would be 
helpful to understand the ways in which genes influence the 
evolution of cultural norms, as well as the ways in which 
cultural norms influence the evolution and expression of 
genetic information. Maciek Chudek and coauthors, for 
example, note that human sociality creates a massive need 
for reliable and frequent information transmission: because 
humans work best in societies, and societies work best 
when individuals in those societies share information, we 
should think that humans have developed capacities and 
tendencies to share that information. So there’s a selection 
pressure on humans to create culture which provides 
adaptive benefits to those humans. In other words, the 
contingencies of human life create the need for culture. 
However, culture itself acts as a constraint on which sorts 
of genes are expressed and passed on and which are 
defeated by the evolutionary process (Chudek et al. pp. 
438-9). This is just to say that, when looking at the 
evidence presented by Kelly and Heyes, we need to take it 
with a grain of salt, always keeping in mind that it’s not 
just biological processes which create norms; it works the 
other way around as well.  
 
To motivate this point, we can see a similar pattern of 
environment/organism co-evolution with respect to the 
way that certain lifeforms control their environments, and 
are at the same time controlled by those environments. In 
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Jessica C. Flack and colleagues’ essay “Timescales, 
Symmetry, and Uncertainty Reduction in the Origins of 
Hierarchy in Biological Systems,” where the relations 
between coral reef systems and their environments are 
discussed, it is noted that, since ocean currents and 
temperatures play a significant role in the sorts of coral 
life that can develop, reefs often grow in ways that 
actually control currents and temperatures in a way that 
makes those systems more likely to flourish (Flack et al. 
pp. 62-4). In the same way that there is a bidirectional 
relationship between reefs and the environments which 
constrain the sorts of reefs that can grow, there is a 
bidirectional relationship between biological processes 
and ethical norms which arise out of those processes and 
constrain the ways that humans can behave.  
 
From the perspective of Chudek, Flack, and their 
numerous coauthors, it might seem to be misplaced to ask 
whether culture or genetics is ‘prior’ to the other; to ask 
which one is primarily responsible for the existence of the 
other. The right answer to this question might be simply 
that there is no real answer; that it’s a hopeless ‘chicken 
and egg’ dilemma. Parallel to this point is Brett Calcott’s 
recognition that proximate explanations for an 
evolutionary phenomenon, whereby we explain the 
adaptation in terms of its benefit to individuals, and 
ultimate explanations for the phenomenon, whereby we 
explain the adaptation in terms of its benefits to the 
survival of the species itself, both have a rightful place in 
evolutionary theory, and that to preference one over the 
other as a matter of principle is myopic (Calcott pp. 251-
2). If this is right, then the argument presented by Don 
Ross in his contribution to this volume, “The Evolution of 
Individualistic Norms,” needs to be amended. Ross argues 
that evolutionary biologists are guilty of assuming an 
individualistic framework when discussing evolution: we 
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look to what it is that individuals themselves do and 
benefit from to understand why things happen as they do. 
And, because of this, we get what he calls ‘normative 
individualism’, the view that individuals ought primarily 
to act to follow their own interests. This, according to 
him, is a mistake, because “genes in all multicellular 
organisms maximize the inclusive fitness of their bearers 
by entangling their fortunes with those of other genes” 
(Ross p. 22). We often have strong incentives to adopt 
altruistic norms, because our fortunes live and die with the 
fortunes of others. So a strict methodological indivi-
dualism would seem to be a dogma that can be dispensed 
with. However, from the perspective of Chudek and 
coauthors, this might be seen as placing undue importance 
on the ‘culture’ side of the equation: though the 
evolutionary process is not individualistic in the sense 
Ross thinks many evolutionary theorists take for granted, 
the actions themselves can only be made sense of in terms 
of individual decisions and actions. For example, Ross 
cites evidence that individuals who know that their 
decisions will bind the group that they belong to end up 
choosing actions which are individually ineffective but 
collectively beneficial, but nonetheless see this as the 
correct choice to make (Ross p. 31). So in a sense these 
individuals sacrifice their own interests to those of the 
group, but in another sense, these individuals do what to 
them seems like the best course of action, all things taken 
into account. If Ross’s conclusion is simply that an 
individualist picture of evolution can’t account for 
everything perfectly, then he is right, but if his argument 
is that individualism is an errant approach (as he suggests 
at p. 37), then he is going too far. It might be better to 
follow Chudek and coauthors and simply say that there is 
no complete answer to be given here, though 
individualistic and collective frameworks might both be 
useful in certain cases. 
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V. 
 
Though our normative capacities clearly play a hefty role in 
our ability to form cooperative systems, they cannot by 
themselves account for the existence of cooperation. 
Because it is often a significant burden on individuals to act 
altruistically, some will not do these actions unless they have 
some sort of external force motivating them to do so. Thus, 
an understanding of the evolutionary development of 
punishment and coercion is crucial to understanding how 
altruistic behavior can be maintained.  
 
A number of authors in this volume address versions of this 
question. Ben Fraser, addressing the problem of ‘false 
advertising’, or organisms behaving in certain ways that 
trick others into thinking that the organism is a more 
desirable partner for cooperation than that individual really 
is, notes that there may be a few ways that this can be 
solved. First, obviously, we punish those who cheat 
evolution in this way; more detail on this point to come. 
Less obviously, however, groups often develop 
‘commitment devices’ to disincentivize cheating. There are 
some societies where group membership is denoted by 
ritual scarring or tattooing; these signs can be quite difficult 
to fake convincingly and thus seem to prevent individuals 
from falsely denoting themselves as group members (Fraser 
p. 168). Daniel M. T. Fessler and Katinka Quintelier 
provide a painstaking and illuminating discussion of these 
commitment devices and the sorts of variety that they come 
in. One fascinating example they give is the modern 
institution of engagement rings: since women can no longer 
sue men who have broken off engagements, a norm of 
providing wedding rings as proof of one’s desire to marry 
has developed and become embedded quite deeply in our 
culture (Fessler and Quintelier pp. 471-2).  
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Commitment devices clearly have a role to play here, but 
they cannot play the entirety of the role that they would 
need to in order to explain the external forces which 
prevent defection from cooperative behaviors, because 
commitment devices are often explicitly and intentionally 
chosen by the organism in question. Sometimes, however, 
societies need to go against the wishes of individuals to 
preserve cooperative behaviors. Thus, societies have 
developed the institutions of punishment. Fiery Cushman, 
in a crucial essay “The Role of Learning in Punishment, 
Prosociality, and Human Uniqueness”, discusses these 
evolutionary mechanisms in detail. There, he tries to 
provide an account of punishment that does the most 
effective work in promoting prosociality. Specifically, he 
argues that we should expect ‘inflexible punishment’ 
strategies to develop, where individuals are punished 
regardless of whether punishment will tend to decrease 
their antisocial behavior. This is because punishment 
involves a highly cognitively simple connection between 
the antisocial action and the consequences imposed; in 
order to form the intended associations between antisocial 
action and external sanctions, punishment is most effective 
when it is swift and clearly understood. There is little room 
for ‘nuance’ in the relation between the behavior deserving 
of punishment and the organism who did it, since the 
tendency to be influenced by punishment is parasitic on our 
general capacities to be operantly conditioned (Cushman 
pp. 342-4). 
 
VI. 
 
As I said before, given the highly diverse nature of the 
essays presented in Cooperation and its Evolution, I am 
unable to discuss a number of interesting essays in detail 
here. In particular, Richard Joyce’s discussion of moral 
nativism is a valuable work on the implications for 
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metaethics of evolutionary science and will be particularly 
interesting to those readers familiar with his previous work, 
as it can be seen as a departure from some of his earlier 
claims. Haim Ofek’s paper on biological differences which 
can explain the unique human propensity to cooperate with 
each other is also worth perusing.  
 
Perhaps this book’s greatest strength is its diversity: in 
providing such a great variety of viewpoints on biological 
and philosophical issues involving the evolution of 
cooperation, it is sure to appeal to a great number of readers 
in subdisciplines across these fields. Ultimately, however, 
this book’s greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: 
the sheer size and variety that it contains makes it difficult 
to get a handle on, from the perspective of the reader. 
Indeed, it is a lengthy text; thus, readers need some idea of 
what they’re interested in if they are to benefit most 
efficiently from its cutting-edge evidence and 
argumentation. The editor’s introduction is surely helpful in 
this respect, and I hope that this review can aid other 
readers in making this excellent book work for them. 
